Extant theory claims a firm's information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity financing. However, empirical evidence supporting this contention is limited. We evaluate this relation within the context of Regulation FD (Reg FD) which prohibited the use of selective disclosure. We find firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to resort to debt financing following the passage of Reg FD. This relation is not sensitive to whether a firm has relied on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. We also evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find firms that adopted an expansive public disclosure policy are more likely to turn to equity financing. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the pecking order theory: firms with deteriorated firm information environments increase their use of less information sensitive debt while firms with improved information environments favor the use of equity financing.
Introduction
This study aims to shed light on the relation between a firm's information environment and its financing decisions. Theoretically, Myers and Majluf (1984) consider a setting where information asymmetry exists between a firm and its outside investors. They posit equity is a more information sensitive security than debt and hence, more prone to mispricing, particularly in the presence of information asymmetry. Thus, information asymmetry leads to a financing pecking order where information problematic firms resort to debt financing before equity financing (Myers 1984) .
1 While intuitively appealing, there is limited empirical support of this relation between the information environment and firm financing choices. Garmaise and Natividad (2010, 2560) explain this shortcoming as follows:
"Asymmetric information plays a prominent role in modern theories of corporate finance, but empirically analyzing and assessing the impact of informational frictions has proven to be difficult. Credible exogenous information proxies are hard to find, and there are relatively few natural experiments that result in significant shifts in the information environment. As a result, in contrast to the significant and wellestablished stream of theoretical work on asymmetric information and financial contracting, empirical research in this area is still in a somewhat early stage of development."
We contribute to this inquiry by taking advantage of a natural experiment involving a change in the disclosure regime. Specifically, we focus on the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 23, 2000. The intent of the regulation was to improve both the form and flow of firm specific information. Specifically, Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of firm specific information to parties outside a firm such as analysts and institutional investors with the intent to increase the flow of firm specific information in the form of public disclosure. Early research focused on assessing the mean effect of Regulation FD on the firm information environment (see e.g. Heflin et al. 2003 , Agrawal et al. 2006 . 2 The evidence is mixed as some studies found Regulation FD improved the information environment, while others found Reg FD had a detrimental effect on the firm information environment. Subsequent research, in particular Wang (2007) , argues that these findings are not altogether surprising since the effects of Reg FD need not be uniform across the affected firms. She notes that if a firm faces low proprietary costs of public disclosure, it will replace selective disclosure with public disclosure. However, if proprietary costs of public disclosure are substantial, then a firm will replace selective disclosure with nondisclosure, causing deterioration in its information environment. Wang (2007) 1 The information environment also plays a role in asset pricing (Lambert et al. 2007, Easley and O'Hara 2004) . For example, Easley and O'Hara (2004) contend that information risk is not a diversifiable risk and in fact, contributes to a higher cost of equity capital. The authors define information risk to include information dissemination, the fraction of investors who receive private signals, and information asymmetry, the fraction of signals that are available only to informed investors. While important, this stream of literature does not directly speak to the issue of firm financing choice, which is the focus of this study. 2 To evaluate the effects of Reg FD, prior research focused on both stock market (e.g. Chen et al. 2009 ) and financial analyst based measures of the information environment (e.g. Heflin et al. 2003) .
finds empirical evidence consistent with these predictions. In particular, she finds high (low) proprietary cost firms replaced selective disclosure with nondisclosure (public disclosure).
We use Wang (2007) as a point of departure in this study. Principally, we recognize that the effects of Reg FD are not uniform across firms. Given the impact of Reg FD on the firm information environment, we examine whether and how the regulation induced changes in firm environment impact a manager's preference for debt or equity financing. The benefit of this setting is twofold. First, the change in disclosure regulation represents an exogenous shock to the information environment of firms. Hence Reg FD provides a useful setting to empirically evaluate models such as the pecking order theory which assume a firm's information environment is exogenously determined. Second, the safe harbor provisions of Reg FD allow firms to continue to make selective disclosures to debt credit rating agencies, and this is an important feature to firms facing considerable costs of public disclosure. To the extent that Reg FD induces greater public disclosure, the reduction in a firm's information asymmetry reduces the cost of and increases the firm's preference for equity financing. On the contrary, for the subset of firms for which the regulation functions as an impediment to the flow of firm specific information, managers may prefer debt financing over equity financing.
Extant literature provides several reasons as to why the choice between debt and equity is related to the firm information environment (e.g. Myers 1984) . First, debt is a less information-sensitive security than equity (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Second, in the presence of information asymmetry, debt financing can signal positive information about a firm's expected stream of cash flows (Ross 1977) . Third, within the context of Reg FD, the regulation provides a safe harbor exemption, which allows continued private disclosure to debt related intermediaries such as credit rating agencies of firm specific nonpublic information such as "budgets and forecasts, as well as advance notification of major corporate events such as a merger," information not privately available to a firm's equity analysts (Joynt 2002) . Furthermore, this
Reg FD exemption serves to "promote an uninhibited response to requests for information" from credit rating agencies (Joynt 2002) . Thus, firms that find public disclosure costly can benefit from debt markets which do not prohibit selective disclosure of firm specific information.
Our empirical analysis evaluates the impact of Regulation FD on the choice between debt and equity financing. To the extent that Reg FD impacted a firm's information environment, theory anticipates the regulation to have a bearing on firm financing decisions. Our analysis follows prior research in that we start with the recognition that Reg FD does not impose uniform information effects on all firms. As such, we consider the differential information effects of Reg FD across firms. Whether Reg FD positively or negatively impacts a firm's information environment depends on a firm's proprietary costs of public disclosure (Wang 2007) . Hence, we account for the differential impact of Reg FD by considering these proprietary costs. Principally, we examine whether high proprietary cost firms are more likely to turn to less information sensitive debt financing in the post Reg FD regime. Separately, Wang (2007) 
notes that
Reg FD largely targets firms that rely on selective disclosure. To the extent that this is true, one could argue that Reg FD will have a distinct impact on the financing choices of firms that relied on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. However, it is not clear, ex-ante, as to the direction in which the financing choices of the selective disclosure firms are affected by Reg FD. The reason is that firms can resort to selective disclosure in the face of high public disclosure costs. Hence, there can be an overlap between proprietary costs and the use of selective disclosure. However, low proprietary cost firms can also take advantage of the available option for selective disclosure. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) suggest that public disclosure is problematic for managers and hence they may forgo public disclosure even in the absence of proprietary costs of public disclosure. 3 Hence, the use of selective disclosure may not be entirely reflective of proprietary costs of public disclosure. Given the conflicting reasons as to why firms resort to selective disclosure, it is not obvious as to the impact of RegFD on the financing choice of selective disclosure firms. We also assess the three-way interaction involving selective disclosure, proprietary costs of public disclosure, and Reg FD. This interaction allows us to evaluate whether the differential impact of Reg FD on the financing choices of firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure is more pronounced among firms that relied on selective disclosure. Following prior research, we initially identify selective disclosure firms as those having analyst coverage. Firms provide information to analysts which is relevant to their formation of earnings expectations. In fact, the "majority of sell-side analysts say they regularly requested and received earnings guidance prior to Reg FD," (Wang 2007 (Wang , 1303 . Furthermore, the earnings guidance was considered to be either similarly or more important than other sources of information (Wang 2007 ). Nonetheless, it should be noted that such selective disclosure does not necessarily imply high public disclosure costs.
Our next set of analysis identifies the changes in the firm disclosure policy due to Reg FD and relates these changes to firm financing choices. To be specific, we use a subset of data for which we are able to identify a shift either from selective disclosure to public disclosure or a shift from selective disclosure to nondisclosure. The identified changes in disclosure policy are obtained from Wang (2007) . The benefit of this analysis is that it allows us to distinguish between Reg FD induced improvements and deteriorations in the firm information environment and directly relate these changes in a firm's information environment to firm financing choices. In particular, we examine whether a switch from private disclosure to public disclosure reduces (increases) the likelihood of issuing debt (equity) and whether a switch from private disclosure to nondisclosure increases (reduces) the likelihood of issuing debt (equity). proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to turn to debt financing in the post Reg FD regime.
We also examine the interaction between firms' use of selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime and the enactment of Reg FD. This interaction allows us to examine whether the regulation had a distinct and detectible effect on this subset of firms. However, as noted earlier, it is not ex-ante clear as to the impact of Reg FD on the financing choice of these firms. We also include a three-way interaction to examine the joint effect of selective disclosure, proprietary costs of public disclosure, and Reg FD.
Our results are as follows. We find the interaction between Reg FD (RegFD =1 for the post Reg FD period) and proprietary costs of public disclosure is positively associated with the issuance of debt. This evidence suggests that high proprietary cost firms are more likely to resort to debt financing in the post Reg FD regime. Given that Reg FD shut down the selective disclosure channel, the evidence suggests that high proprietary cost firms find it advantageous to use less information sensitive debt financing. Also, it is indicative that the safe harbor provisions of Reg FD which allow selective disclosure of firm specific information to debt market participants may be valuable to high proprietary cost firms. We find Reg FD has no differential impact on firms that had previously relied on selective disclosure. This is consistent with the argument that the option to use selective disclosure previously was taken advantage of by both high and low proprietary cost firms. Probing further, we find the three-way interaction involving selective disclosure, proprietary costs of public disclosure, and RegFD is not statistically significant. This evidence rules out support for the contention that Reg FD has an incrementally more detrimental impact on the information environment of selective disclosure firms with high public disclosure costs so much so that it induces greater debt financing. Taken together, we find Reg FD positively influences the use of debt financing by high proprietary cost firms and this relation is not sensitive to whether a firm relied on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. This finding holds across multiple measures of proprietary costs of public disclosure.
Our next set of analysis involves the subgroup of our sample firms for which we have measures of
Reg FD induced changes in disclosure policy. When we examine firms which change their disclosure policies, we do find, as expected, that firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to switch from selective disclosure to nondisclosure in the post Reg FD regime. We directly relate the changes in firm disclosure policy to firms' financing choices. We find the switch from selective disclosure to public disclosure reduces (increases) the likelihood of debt (equity) financing. This is consistent with the contention that improvements in the firm information environment favor equity financing. In contrast, we find the switch from selective disclosure to nondisclosure increases (reduces) the likelihood of debt (equity)
financing. This finding is consistent with the argument that deterioration in the firm information environment favors the use of less information sensitive debt financing. Taken together, our results support the contention that changes in the information environment impact a firm's financing decisions.
We contribute to the extant literature in several ways. We contribute to the capital structure literature which aims to understand firm financing choices. As noted earlier, theoretical models such as Myers and Majluf (1984) take the information environment as given (i.e. exogenously determined) and explore whether information asymmetry influences firm financing decisions. They contend that firm financing decisions are conditional on the firm information environment and that information asymmetry favors the use of a less information sensitive security, such as debt, as opposed to equity. This theory provides no guidance on whether a firm should alter its information environment, a decision which involves consideration of costs and benefits of adopting policies such as expanded voluntary disclosure (e.g.
Verrecchia 1983
). Since considerations of changes to the information environment are absent in the analysis of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) , merely relating the firm information environment (or changes to the firm information environment) to firm financing choices is empirically problematic since a firm's transparency (or opacity) is endogenously determined in the real world setting. Garmaise and Natividad (2010) attribute this endogeneity to the lack of support for the role of information asymmetry in firm financing decisions. Our use of a change in disclosure regime helps us limit these endogeneity concerns in prior studies and better identify the relation between the information environment and the choice between debt and equity. 4 We also contribute to the research related to Reg FD. As noted earlier, prior research focused on assessing the mean effect of this regulation on the information environment. For example, Heflin et al. (2003) examine the impact of Reg FD on analyst coverage and analyst forecast properties (see also Gomes et al. 2007 ). Chen et al. (2009) focus on the impact of Reg FD on a firm's ex-ante cost of equity capital and find that the cost of equity capital decreases post Reg FD. In contrast, Gomes et al. (2007) find Reg FD had an adverse effect on the information environment, especially for firms with high proprietary costs of disclosure. Wang (2007) documents similar findings and notes that the effects of Reg FD do not appear uniform across firms. Our evidence supports this contention as we find Reg FD positively impacts the preference of debt (equity) financing by high (low) proprietary cost firms.
Our study is mindful of Healy's (2008) concern that merely examining changes around Reg FD is problematic given the presence of confounding events such as the Global Research Analyst Settlement (2001). 5 Our study does not make broad claims about the impact of Reg FD per se due to the noted confounding macroeconomic events. Rather, we carefully examine the differential impact of Reg FD as it relates to its interaction with firm attributes. In particular, we evaluate finer predictions where we identify the affected firms and take into consideration their proprietary costs of public disclosure. Also, we directly evaluate changes in firm disclosure environment around Reg FD and relate these improvements or deteriorations in the firm information environment to the debt-equity choice.
We also contribute to the disclosure literature. Prior studies examine the relationship between disclosure and external financing (Frankel et al. 1995, Lang and Lundholm 2000) and whether disclosure affects the cost of external financing (Botosan 1997 , Sengupta 1998 . Specifically, Sengupta (1998) and Botosan (1997) examine whether disclosure contributes to a lower cost of debt and equity financing respectively. However, few studies, if any, examine the impact of disclosure on the choice between debt and equity financing. In part, this paper fills this void and examines external financing decisions in a setting where regulation has altered firm disclosure policy.
In a concurrent working paper, Petacchi (2012) also examines the impact of Reg FD on firm capital structure. We differ from her study in two important ways. First, we focus on the differential public disclosure costs faced by firms and distinguish between firms unlikely to experience an improved information environment after Reg FD from those more likely to improve or increase their information flows. In doing so, we recognize that the impact of Reg FD is not uniform across firms. Second, we depart from Petacchi (2012) in that the PIN metric plays a central role in her analysis. Recently, studies have questioned the extent to which the PIN metric represents a measure of information risk related to a firm (Mohanram and Rajgopal 2009) . Our analysis focuses directly on changes in firm disclosure policy and previously documented measures of public disclosure costs.
Related Literature
To evaluate the impact of the information environment on firm financing decisions, we take advantage of a change in disclosure regime, Reg FD. The SEC enacted Reg FD in 2000 to prohibit selective disclosure of firm specific information "to a subset of market participants such as analysts and institutional investors 5 The Global Research Analyst Settlement stemmed from an investigation of the effect of investment banking practices on equity research. The intent of the Global Settlement was to improve the reliability of analyst research in part by regulating the use of investment banking to support sell-side research and requiring banks to provide independent research to clients. Other confounding events include the devaluation of technology stocks, decimalization of the stock exchanges, disclosure of fraud at Enron and Worldcom, and the economic recession that followed 9/11. without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the investing public" (Chen et al. 2009, 107 Prior research examines the effect of Reg FD on firm disclosure policy, analyst forecast attributes, and measures of the overall information environment. For instance, Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003) find voluntary disclosure improved in the post Reg FD regime, consistent with Reg FD inducing greater public disclosure. In a similar vein, Agrawal et al. (2006) and Mohanram and Sunder (2006) find improvements in both analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion. 7 Mohanram and Sunder (2006) also analyze whether analysts increase idiosyncratic information discovery post Reg FD and find that analysts decrease coverage for well-followed firms and increase coverage for firms less-followed before Reg FD. Jorion et al. (2005) evaluate whether the informativeness of credit rating upgrades and downgrades changes after Reg FD. They find the stock price impact of credit rating changes increases post Reg FD, suggesting credit rating agencies "remain the main conduits of selective disclosures" after the enactment of Reg FD (Jorion 6 The SEC provides three reasons as to why they support the enactment of Regulation FD (Gomes et al. 2007 ). First, selective disclosure provides an informational advantage to investors who have access to firm specific disclosures "at the expense of those kept in the dark" (SEC 2000) . Second, firms can use selective disclosure to influence external monitors, such as analysts, by offering access to firm specific information in exchange for positive reviews and recommendations. This contention is supported by prior research which finds that analysts make optimistic earnings forecasts to obtain access to firm specific information (Hong 2004) . Third, the SEC claims selective disclosure is no longer necessary to achieve stock market efficiency. With improvements in technology, analysts and institutional investors are no longer viewed as necessary agents to achieve market efficiency. In enacting Regulation FD, the SEC's underlying assumption is that information previously selectively disclosed will now be provided more broadly, through communication mechanisms such as voluntary public disclosure (Gomes et al. 2007 ). 7 Heflin et al. (2003) also examine analyst earnings forecasts but they fail to find a significant change in analyst forecast accuracy or dispersion. Modigliani and Miller (1958) note that in a world of perfect capital markets, capital structure decisions are value irrelevant because they do not affect firm cash flows but merely affect the division of cash flows between a firm's debtholders and equityholders. However, this world of perfect capital markets is not
realistic. An important imperfection is the information asymmetry between a firm and its outside investors.
This information asymmetry creates a wedge between a firm's internal and external cost of financing, and capital structure decisions are no longer viewed as value irrelevant (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Principally, Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that firms with poor information environments, i.e. higher information asymmetry, use internal funds first before proceeding to raise funds externally. If the firm resorts to external financing, it will opt for less information sensitive debt before turning to information sensitive equity funds (Myers and Majluf 1984, Myers 1984) .
As noted earlier, Reg FD impacts the firm information environment but its effects are not identical across firms. If Reg FD induces greater disclosure of firm specific information, thus improving the information environment, the pecking order theory advanced by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) suggests firms will more likely issue an information sensitive security such as equity. However, the restrictions posed by Reg FD may hurt the information environment if a firm is unwilling to publicly disclose information previously disclosed selectively. For these firms, Reg FD may render equity financing less attractive than less information sensitive debt financing since Reg FD continues to allow selective disclosure of firm specific information to credit rating agencies. Whether Reg FD improves or hurts the firm information environment is dependent on the proprietary costs of public disclosure and whether the firm utilized the private disclosure channels eliminated by Reg FD. For high proprietary cost firms utilizing private communication channels, Reg FD hurts the firm information environment since selective disclosure represents an important channel to convey firm specific information. For these high proprietary cost firms, theory anticipates Reg FD will result in an increased preference for debt financing. For low proprietary cost firms, Reg FD induces a move from selective disclosure to public disclosure (Wang 2007 ) as a move towards public disclosure is less costly. For these low proprietary cost firms, firms may be more willing to resort to information sensitive equity financing following the enactment of Reg FD. We next empirically evaluate these predictions.
Sample Selection
Our sample of debt and equity issuances is determined using annual firm level data from Compustat between 1997 and 2003. Consistent with prior research, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), the former because their financial structures differ from other firms and the latter because they face additional regulations on capital. We identify our debt (equity) issuing firms using a similar methodology used in prior studies (Hovakimian et al. 2004 and 2001 , Leary and Roberts 2010 , and Korajczyk and Levy 2003 for example). 8 As we are interested in firm financing decisions, particularly those using external funds to finance investment (Myers and Majluf 1984) , we classify each sample firm as a firm issuing debt (equity) when net cash debt (equity) issuances as per the statement of cash flows are in excess of 5% of the prior year's assets. We exclude any firm that does not meet our debt/equity issuance threshold or any firm identified as issuing both debt and equity in the same fiscal year. This approach allows us to include firms issuing public or private debt and equity, yet exclude firms which are refinancing debt or engaging in debt for equity swaps or conversions. To ensure we are not picking up initial public offerings, we require our observations to have market price information for two years prior to the equity issuance. We further exclude any observation that does not have data available to construct our control and proprietary cost measures which leaves 4,353 annual observations meeting our requirements. All non-categorical variables are trimmed to the 1% and 99% values annually to mitigate the impact of outliers. Table 1 provides the descriptive comparison between our debt and equity observations for a number of characteristics known to influence a firm's preference for external financing source. Panel A provides the descriptive comparison between our debt and equity observations of the full sample, and consistent with prior research, we find that our median equity issuing firm is significantly smaller, has more growth opportunities, more earnings variability, less asset tangibility, and greater financing needs. Since we are examining shifts in financing decisions after Reg FD, we rely on the fact that our debt firms and equity firms remain relatively comparable to each other across time.
Insert Table 1 about here 8 Of the 21,553 firm observations between 1997 and 2003 which remain after making similar data exclusions as in Leary and Roberts (2010) (LR), we find we have slightly less debt issuers (16.0% versus 22.6% in LR and slightly more equity issuances 10.4% in our sample versus 7.1% in LR); however, given our time period in relation to the longer LR sample period between 1980 and 2005, we find these differences reasonable.
In Panels B and C of Table 1 , we compare the descriptive statistics of our debt and equity firms across the pre and post Reg FD regimes. With respect to incremental firm financing decisions, we find a decline in the proportion of debt issuing firms relative to equity firms across time as 68.3% of our pre Reg FD observations issued debt while only 55.7% of our post Reg FD observations issued debt. These changes may reflect broad trends in incremental firm financing choices or changes in financing patterns that may or may not be related to Reg FD. At this juncture, it is difficult to attribute these financing patterns to any one of these explanations. Besides the changes in financing patterns, we also find the mean (median) amount of the debt issued declined from 22.5% (13.0%) to 18.8% (12.1%) of prior year assets, the mean (median) equity issue, while larger than the debt issued, remained relatively unchanged over time (45.3% (21.6%) in the pre Reg FD period to 48.6% (19.9%) post Reg FD).
Finally, we find the mean level of proprietary costs of debt firms increases in the post Reg FD period.
This finding holds across multiple measures of proprietary costs of public disclosure (and litigation risk):
industry competitiveness, Competitive, high technology industry membership, High Tech; research and development intensity, R&D; and litigation risk, Litigation Risk. For the equity firms, apart from a slight increase in firms facing higher litigation costs, no other changes are noted in our proprietary cost proxies.
When selective disclosure is permitted, firms can privately convey firm specific information and hence, an information sensitive security such as equity is still viable for a firm facing high proprietary costs of public disclosure. By restricting selective disclosure, high proprietary cost firms will find less information sensitive securities, such as debt, as cost advantageous. The above evidence supports this contention.
Empirical Design
The aim of our study is to examine whether changes in firm information environment induced by Reg FD influenced the choice between debt and equity financing. Following prior research, we recognize that the information effects of Reg FD need not be uniform across firms and that it is impacted by a firm's proprietary costs of public disclosure. We also take into consideration the argument that Reg FD largely targets and hence impacts firms that relied on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. We next take a firm's proprietary costs and selective disclosure into account in evaluating the impact of Reg FD on firm financing choices.
To examine firm financing choices around Reg FD, we estimate a logit model that regresses firm financing choices involving debt or equity issuances on Reg FD, propriety costs of disclosure, an indicator The dependent variable, Debtfund, is a dichotomous variable depicting the choice between debt and equity.
We base our analysis on the assumption that managers make optimal financing choices involving debt and equity, given their set of circumstances (Mackie-Mason 1990) . To the extent that Reg FD impacts a firm's information environment, it becomes a relevant variable of consideration in this choice setting. However, we recognize the impact of Reg FD on the firm information environment is nuanced in that it may not affect the information environment of all firms and that these effects may not be the same across the effected firms. As such, our focus is on the interactions between Reg FD and firm attributes and how these interactions influence a firm's financing decisions.
Our baseline model specification which includes controls for size, mispricing, profitability, tangibility, and macroeconomic conditions is as follows:
Pre followed * RegFD6 Pre followed * Proprietary Cost 7 Proprietary Cost *
Before proceeding, it is important to discuss the empirical methodology employed in our multivariate analysis. An appropriate empirical framework for the present setting is the difference-indifference (DID) methodology. In DID, one distinguishes between a treatment and control group of firms and assesses the differential effect due to a particular treatment (such as Reg FD). While Reg FD covers all U.S. public firms, studies such as Wang (2007) contend that it largely impacts firms that previously relied on selective disclosure. Hence, one could argue that researchers should distinguish between the treatment and control firms on the basis of a firm's use of selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD period.
However, firms can rely on selective disclosure for several reasons. While many firms may wish to avoid public disclosure costs, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) contend that managers may be reticent to publicly disclose even in the absence of disclosure related proprietary costs. The point here is that a firm could have adopted a selective disclosure policy even when public disclosure was not prohibitively costly.
Alternatively, a researcher could differentiate between the treatment and control firms on the basis of a firm's proprietary costs of public disclosure. High proprietary cost firms are more likely to rely on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime and may have experienced a more adverse shock to their information environment after enactment of Reg FD as public disclosure is not likely a viable option for these firms. In light of these issues, we depart from traditional DID models and include multiple interactions to better assess whether and how Reg FD affects firm financing choices. 10 In doing so, our aim is to disentangle the effects of various factors that can influence firm response to the policy change.
Debtfund is equal to one for a debt issuance and 0 for an equity issuance.
Test and Proprietary Cost Variables
RegFD is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years beginning between October 2000 and January 2003. This variable reflects the change in the disclosure regime which prohibited selective disclosure. We clearly recognize this variable can also reflect changes in other macroeconomic variables.
Other concurrent events such as the Global Research Analyst Settlement make it difficult to strictly interpret the RegFD coefficient as only reflecting the informational effects of Reg FD. As such, we focus on narrower predictions and relate the interaction between the change in disclosure regulation and firm attributes to firm financing decisions.
The baseline model above includes several interactions between the enactment of Reg FD and firm attributes. We include an interaction between RegFD and proprietary costs of public disclosure. By restricting selective disclosure, Reg FD can have an adverse impact on the information environment of high proprietary cost firms. Hence, debt financing may be more attractive for these firms in the post Reg FD regime since it represents a less information sensitive security. Furthermore, debt is also attractive since Reg FD provides a safe harbor provision which permits a firm to selectively disclose to debt market participants such as credit rating agencies. Hence, we anticipate the coefficient on this interaction to be positive. We also include a three-way interaction involving the use of selective disclosure (Pre followed), RegFD, and proprietary costs of public disclosure. This interaction accounts for the argument that Reg FD affects only the subset of firms that had previously relied on selective disclosure. Hence, it is argued that it is selective disclosers with high proprietary costs that are more likely to turn to debt financing in the post Reg FD regime. The coefficient on this three-way interaction is expected to be positive. We also include an interaction between RegFD and firm use of selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. By restricting selective disclosure, one could argue that Reg FD hurts the information flow of these firms and as a result induces an increase in debt financing in the post Reg FD regime. However, this argument presumes that firms opted for selective disclosure because public disclosure is costly. As noted above, firms may avoid public disclosure even in the absence of high proprietary costs of disclosure. The implication is that selective disclosure firms may switch to public disclosure in the post Reg FD regime without incurring significant proprietary costs. As such, we do not predict a sign for the coefficient on this interaction.
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To identify firms that rely on selective disclosure, we include an indicator variable, Pre followed, which takes on a value of 1 when the firm is followed by more than one analyst in the two years preceding
Reg FD (i.e. 1999 and . 12 Financial analysts are typically characterized as key recipients of information through the selective disclosure channel (e.g. Gomes et al. 2007) . 13 To the extent that Reg FD adversely affects the information environment of firms that rely on selective disclosure, we expect a positive coefficient on this interaction variable, indicating a shift towards less information sensitive debt financing.
Since we cannot directly measure proprietary (and litigation) costs of public disclosure facing a firm, we follow prior research and proxy for these costs using several firm characteristics. Prior research notes that public disclosure affects a firm's competitive position, particularly in settings where there is intense product market competition. 14 We identify a firm as operating within a Competitive market if its industry is measured within the top tercile of competitive industries using the fitted SIC-based annual industry concentration data from Hoberg and Phillips (2010) .
15
Our second proprietary cost measure, High Tech, indicates whether a firm belongs to a high tech industry. 16 Since high technology firms have higher growth opportunities, increased public disclosure could erode the firm's competitive position. High technology firms also exhibit higher stock price volatility, raising the risk of "class action lawsuits filed in response to a drop in the stock's price and alleging that some disclosure (or failure to make disclosure) was either false or misleading," (Brooks and Wang 2004, 8) . Thus, the Reg FD induced elimination of selective disclosure could adversely impact the information environment of high technology firms.
Litigation risk is related to High Tech as Kasnik and Lev (1995) and Francis et al. (1994) find high tech firms are subject to a higher rate of shareholder lawsuits than other industries. We follow Kim and 11 For completeness, we also include an interaction between firm use of selective disclosure and proprietary costs of public disclosure. This interaction aims to capture the joint impact of these two variables in the pre Reg FD regime. Given the wide range of reasons as to why a manager may opt for selective disclosure, the sign on the relation between this interaction and the choice of financing is not ex-ante clear. 12 Selective disclosers are defined as an indicator variable measured as a 1 for any firm followed by two or more analysts prior to Reg FD. Like Frankel and Lee (1998) , if a firm is not included in IBES, we consider it to have a 0 analyst following. 1,455 of our 2,531 firms meet this definition of a followed firm. 13 A shortcoming of this measure is that it does not reflect demand side considerations such as proprietary costs of public disclosure that can affect firm use of selective disclosure. In a sense, the analyst based measure of selective disclosure can be viewed as capturing the supply of selectively disclosed information.
14 In untabulated results we use a measure of Hindex based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of a firm's sales in relation to the distribution of sales within the firm's industry. Empirically, there is considerable difficulty evaluating the relation between product market competition and debt-equity decisions since product market competition and capital structure are endogenously determined (Xu 2012) . The inclusion of Hindex in place of Competitive did not alter our findings; thus, our main results only consider the dichotomous measure. 15 Hoberg and Phillips generously provide access to this data at www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/. 16 As per Bushee et al. (2004) , we consider high technology industries to include the following SIC codes: 2833-2836, 3612-3613, 3621-3629, 3651-3652, 3661-3669, 3671-3672, 3674, 3695, 4812-4822, and 4832-4899. Skinner (2012) and measure our third measure of proprietary costs, Litigation Risk, as 1 if the firm operates in a litigious industry as per Francis et al. (1994) 17 and exceeds the median in one of the following: lagged total assets, monthly stock price volatility or lagged sales growth. Litigation Risk is measured as of the end of the prior year. Litigation risk can discourage public disclosure and by prohibiting selective disclosure, Reg FD is more likely detrimental to the information environment of a firm with high litigation risk of disclosure.
The fourth measure of proprietary costs is research and development intensity (R&D). Prior research notes that property rights associated with product innovation are imperfectly enforced (King et al. 1990 ).
Consequently firms with higher research and development expenditures may limit information flows if public disclosure is viewed as increasing competitive pressure and reducing the value of investments.
Finally, since we acknowledge potential overlap in our proprietary cost measures, we construct a Composite factor as the factor score from the factor analysis of Competitive, High Tech, Litigation Risk, and R&D.
Control Variables
We include additional control variables found in prior research to influence a firm's financing decisions. We control for firm size, Size, which is the percentile of the firm's market value of equity measured against the NYSE as of the beginning of the year. We control for both growth opportunities and potential market mispricing (Baker and Wurgler 2002) with Market to Book measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of common equity as of the beginning of the year. Asset tangibility is controlled by Net PP&E or net property plant and equipment divided by book assets as of the beginning of the year. To proxy for the risk of a firm's earnings performance (and hence the risk of its cash flow realizations), we measure Earn Var as the standard deviation of the change in earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes divided by the mean of total assets for ten years prior to the observation year (or for a minimum of four years if data is missing). To control for a firm's tax exhaustion (or inability to use additional interest deductions to reduce the firm's tax obligation), we calculate tcDUM as a trichotomous variable that equals 0 if the firm has an unused net operating loss (NOL) carryforward and negative taxable income in the prior year, 1 if the firm has either an unused NOL carryforward or negative taxable income in the prior year, and 2 if the firm has no unused NOL carryforward and positive taxable income in the prior year (Shevlin 1990) . Lag Leverage controls for a firm's existing level of debt (Welch 2004 ) and is measured as debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by assets as of the beginning of the year (Frank and Goyal 2009) . 18 We control for a firm's level of institutional ownership to proxy for limitations on a 17 Francis et al. (1994) define litigious industries as biotechnology (sic 2833 to 2836 and 8731 to 8734), computer (sic 3570 to 3577 and 7370 to 7374), electronics (sic 3600 to 3674) or retail (sic 5200 to 5961). 18 In lieu of Lag Leverage we include a measure of financial condition as reflected in credit ratings. Non-Invst. Grade takes on a value of 1 when a firm's credit rating in the fiscal period before the debt or equity issue is below BBB-and 0 otherwise. A low credit rating points to the presence of financial constraints in that it limits firm access to external funds. For those firms that do not have an S&P credit rating reported in Compustat, we derive a credit rating using the method in Barth et al. (2008) . As firm's overinvestment risk (Dhaliwal et al. 2007 ) and measure Iown as the percentage of shares held by institutions to common shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. 19 Finally, we proxy for a firm's financing need by measuring Deficit which is calculated as the excess of operating cash flows less payments for dividends, capital expenditures, increases in working capital, and current portion of long-term debt at the beginning of the period (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999).
Additionally, we include controls for conditions in the external financing markets which may impact the cost of additional debt or equity financing. ΔAAA is an indicator of changing interest rates and is measured as the mean monthly change in the AAA corporate bond rates over the year. 20 We include fiscal year indicator variables to control for systematic time effects influencing a firm's financing decision and adjust the standard errors for clustering by firm and fiscal year.
Empirical Results

Reg FD and Firm Financing Decisions
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 Panels A and B present the correlation among our control and proprietary cost variables for the 4,353 firms issuing debt or equity over our sample time period. We find, consistent with prior research, that firms more likely to issue debt are larger and exhibit higher asset tangibility, and have higher institutional ownership but have lower market to book ratios, earning variance and deficits (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995 , Bharath et al. 2009 , Frank and Goyal 2009 , Leary and Roberts 2010 . The correlations suggest that the sample is well behaved given that we find the relationships among our Debtfund and control variables consistent with both theory and prior empirical findings.
Insert Table 2 about here
Each proprietary cost proxy may capture a particular dimension of a firm's actual proprietary cost of disclosure. Ideally, we would like to present a model which accounts for each of these proprietary cost dimensions. However, these measures are not orthogonal to each other. In fact, there is high correlation among these measures. Instead, we opt to present a statistically determined composite measure composed of our four individual proprietary cost measures and constructed using factor analysis. 21 In Table 2 , Panel anticipated, the coefficient on Non-Invst. Grade is negative and significant, suggesting that firms with non-investment grade credit ratings exhibit a higher propensity for equity financing than debt financing; however our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. 19 If institutional ownership data is missing Iown is coded 0. 20 We also consider two additional economic controls, EconRec for the period of economic recession from March through November 2001 and TaxAct2003 for changes to the economic environment induced by the enactment of The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Neither of these control variables provide a significant impact upon the models tested. 21 The first principal component factor explains 81% of the common variation among the four proprietary cost measures. Another variation of the composite measure also includes size; however, we note no meaningful improvement and no changes to the results reported.
B, we find the Composite factor appears highly correlated with each of the four proprietary cost measures that it represents. Overall, the univariate results provide support for the argument that firms with high proprietary costs are more likely to issue debt financing after Reg FD. However, the univariate results do not control for cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics that may impact financing choices. We turn to multivariate analysis to address these issues.
Multivariate Results
In our multivariate analysis, we examine how the interaction between Reg FD and firm attributes affects a firm's financing choices. Specifically, we focus on the interaction between Reg FD and the firm's use of selective disclosure, the interaction between Reg FD and firm proprietary costs of disclosure, and the three-way interaction involving Reg FD, selective disclosure, and proprietary costs of disclosure. The latter interaction evaluates whether the enactment of Reg FD induces selective disclosure firms facing high proprietary costs to move towards the less information sensitive security, debt. Table 3 reports the coefficients of the logit regression which operationalizes Equation 1 above. We adjust the standard errors for heteroscedasticity (White 1980) proprietary cost firms and, as a consequence, induces these firms to opt for less information sensitive debt financing.
Insert Table 3 about here
In Model 3 we include Pre followed and the interaction between Pre followed and RegFD. We find that firms followed by an analyst in the pre Reg FD period are more likely to issue equity. This finding is consistent with prior research that notes analysts are key beneficiaries of selectively disclosed information. 22 In Tables 3 and 5 , the t-statistics reported include robust standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal year. We also cluster standard errors by firm and calendar year-end in a model with annual year-end indicator variables and find qualitatively similar results. In this model 713 observations occur during calendar year 2000; we identify 260 of these observations within the pre Reg FD regime and 453 within the post Reg FD regime.
Such selective disclosure can lower the information asymmetry between a firm and its outside investors and hence, increase the likelihood that a firm will rely on equity financing (Chang et al. 2006) . The coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, most likely due to the averaging of the impact upon the high and low proprietary cost firms which are not separately identified in this model. As we noted earlier, firms may use selective disclosure even in the absence of high proprietary costs of public disclosure.
In Model 4 we include Pre followed, Composite factor, and the interaction among Composite factor, Pre followed, and Reg FD. Consistent with prior research we find firms followed by analysts (measured in the pre Reg FD period), Pre followed, prefer equity in the Reg FD period. If firms facing relatively higher proprietary costs show a stronger preference for debt financing after Reg FD, we expect a positive coefficient on the interaction among the proprietary cost measure, Pre followed, and RegFD as we report in Model 4 (p<0.01).
While useful, Model 4 can be viewed as incomplete because it does not consider the interactions between RegFD and Pre followed as well as between RegFD and the and proprietary costs of disclosure.
Thus, Models 5 through 9 include the two-way interaction terms between the respective proprietary cost measure and RegFD and between Pre followed and RegFD. For completeness, we also include the interaction between the proprietary cost measure and Pre followed. In each model, we find that firms followed by an analyst pre Reg FD and firms facing higher proprietary costs exhibit a higher propensity to issue equity, but our focus is on the shift in a firm's financing propensity after Reg FD. Consistent with prior results, we find that firms with higher proprietary costs of disclosure have a higher likelihood of a debt issue after Reg FD for the composite measure, high technology firms, more competitive firms and highly litigious firms. We do not find significance on the interaction among our proprietary cost measures, RegFD, and Pre followed. This finding suggests that the relation is not sensitive to a firm's reliance on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. Taken together, the results suggest that firms with high proprietary costs are more likely to issue debt after Reg FD. A limitation of Pre followed is that when it is zero, we do not distinguish whether the firm was not followed or whether the firm did not have the data available to evaluate its analyst following (i.e. privately traded). In subsequent analysis in Table 5 we examine a more precise measure of disclosure.
A firm's capital structure reflects its cumulative financing decisions over time. More importantly, a capital structure measure considers not only whether the firm issues debt or equity, but also the amount issued. As such, a capital structure measure gives us an idea as to the shift in firm leverage related to Reg FD. We examine whether an analysis of a firm's capital structure yields similar findings to those based on incremental financing decisions. We use multivariate regression to estimate Equation 1 with a capital structure based dependent variable, Debt Ratio, for our sample of debt and equity issuing firms. We define Debt Ratio as the sum of current and long-term liabilities divided by the sum of current and long-term liabilities and the market value of equity at the end of the year. In Model 10, we include Composite factor and its interaction with RegFD as well as our control variables. In Model 11 we also include Composite factor, Pre followed, and all related dual and three way interactions. The results of these models support our prior findings: high proprietary cost firms exhibit an increased propensity for debt financing in the post Reg FD period.
Disclosure Changes and Proprietary Costs
Descriptive Statistics
Our hypotheses rely on the assumption that firms facing higher proprietary costs alleviate information asymmetry by selectively disclosing information to analysts. The regulatory changes to the selective disclosure communication channel after Reg FD caused these firms to reconsider their disclosure policies.
Wang (2007) identifies the disclosure policies of firms in the pre Reg FD period as one of nondisclosure, public disclosure or private (selective) disclosure. She finds that pre Reg FD private disclosers exhibit higher proprietary information costs. In the post FD period, Wang finds that a significant portion of her pre
Reg FD private disclosers replaced selective disclosure with nondisclosure. Wang measured the deterioration of the information environment using price reactions to earnings announcements and changes in analyst forecasts (including forecast errors and forecast dispersions).
We compare the descriptive characteristics of our proprietary cost measures and Wang's disclosure shifts of the private firms over the pre Reg FD period (1997 -1999 to the post Reg FD period (2001 -2003) . In the post Reg FD period, we note which previously private firms Wang (2007) identifies as improving their information environments (i.e. move to public disclosure) and which previously private firms Wang identifies as reducing information flows (i.e. move to nondisclosure). Wang's public disclosers serve as the control group of firms in both the pre and post Reg FD samples. Table 4 is distinct from our main tests as we do not require a firm to issue debt or equity in any sample year as we are only interested in the correlation among disclosure policy changes after Reg FD (increases or decreases) and our proprietary cost measures. For these tests, private (selective) disclosers in the pre Reg FD period equal one and are compared to the public disclosers which equal zero, and we expect to find a positive correlation between the disclosure variable and our four measures of proprietary costs. Higher proprietary cost firms face more competitive disadvantage to a broad and public release of information regarding current performance, current projects and management plans and will prefer to release such information privately, if possible. We expect a negative correlation between our disclosure variable and size as larger firms tend to be more closely followed by analysts, have more sophisticated investor relations and legal resources, and have higher information precision such that private disclosure is not necessary.
Insert Table 4 about here
As reported in Panel A of Table 4 , in the pre Reg FD period, the median public discloser is larger than the median private discloser (when measured by asset size or percentile of market equity), but is no more likely to operate in a competitive or high tech industry, engage in R&D activities or face higher litigation risk than a median private disclosing firm. The correlation, though between private discloser and R&D is positive and significant indicating that higher R&D intensity is associated with policies of selective disclosure. The public disclosing sample includes a higher proportion of high technology firms which is contrary to our expectations. Overall, the limited correlation among private disclosure policies and our proprietary cost measures indicates that firm characteristics had limited impact upon the private versus public disclosure choices made in the pre Reg FD disclosure regime. However, since we examine whether
Reg FD-induced shifts in disclosure policies are related to firm financing choices, we are more concerned with whether a private firm's shift to a more expansive disclosure environment or to a deteriorated information environment is associated with our proprietary cost measures.
In the post Reg FD period, privately disclosing firms needed to make adjustments to their release of information as selective disclosure was no longer allowed. We contend that firms facing higher proprietary costs of disclosure are less willing to release information publicly and choose to not replace formerly private Public firms defined above. We compare the proprietary cost measures of this public group of disclosers to the subsample of private disclosers that moved to nondisclosure (New Nondiscloser) and find that the two groups of firms now differ significantly across all proprietary cost and size measures, in the direction we predict as the high proprietary cost firms tend to elect a nondisclosure policy. Since our sample membership requires a pre Reg FD identification, our sample may suffer from survivorship bias; however, since each group has an equal probability of losing membership to mergers and bankruptcies and faces equal changing economic conditions, we believe that the increased differences between the proprietary cost measures of the two groups results from the firms switching from private to public disclosures and having lower proprietary costs than the average private disclosing firm. Thus, the results of this panel support our contention that the higher the proprietary costs facing a firm, the more likely the firm moves to an information environment characterized by reduced information flows. Our proprietary cost measures are now positively and significantly correlated with an information environment of nondisclosure.
Multivariate Results
We find that Wang (2007) To utilize a difference-in-difference (DID) research design, we use 443 additional annual issuances in our original sample made by 255 firms which Wang (2007) identifies as public disclosers in the pre Reg FD period as our control group. Since these firms already report information through public channels, they are likely less impacted by the regulation's limitations on private communications, yet these firms face the same macroeconomic events as the Private Discloser firms. 23 If public firms make shifts in their disclosure policies after Reg FD, these shifts are likely due to economic causes other than Reg FD. We find the 796 observations in the Wang subsample are comprised of larger firms more likely to issue debt than equity (78.6% debt issues) than in the full sample; however, like the full sample, there is a general decrease in the preference for debt versus equity in the post Reg FD period as the proportion of debt issues drops to 62.3%
in the post Reg FD period. For the full Wang subsample, the median annual debt (equity) issuance is 11.0%
(12.5%) of prior year assets which is smaller than the full sample, but in untabulated results we continue to find that there are few differences in the debt (equity) issuance across the pre and post Reg FD disclosure regimes that are not the result of annual changes in the economic environment.
In Discloser * RegFD indicates a decrease in the propensity to issue debt for the formerly private disclosure firms which is a finding consistent with Reg FD improving the dissemination of information flows for this group. However, this model does not allow us to make distinctions between the disclosure policies of the formerly private firms, all of which were forced to make disclosure changes in the post Reg FD period.
Insert Table 5 about here
To determine whether Reg FD impacted all formerly private disclosing firms similarly, we include two indicator variables to differentiate those formerly private disclosers which increase public information flows after Reg FD (New Public) from formerly private disclosers that did not increase public information flows after Reg FD (New Nondiscloser) using Wang's (2007) measure of disclosure changes in the post Reg FD period. We code a formerly private disclosing firm as New Public if Wang identifies it as moving to a policy of public disclosure post Reg FD and we code a firm as New Nondiscloser if Wang identifies it as moving to a policy of nondisclosure after Reg FD. These results are summarized in Model 3 of Table 5 .
The coefficient on New Public is negative and significant suggesting that while private disclosers in general exhibit an increased propensity for debt financing, formerly private firms that move to a public disclosure policy exhibit a more pronounced increased propensity for equity financing. The coefficient on New Nondiscloser is not significant. This result is consistent with our contention that after the selective disclosure communication channel is eliminated, formerly private disclosing firms must increase their public disclosures in order to make equity an economically efficient means to raise external funds. While we do not report a shift in the preference for debt financing of the New Nondiscloser firms, recall that the Wang subset of firms initiated a higher proportion of debt issues in the pre Reg FD period than the general sample we used previously in Similar to our earlier analysis, we examine whether a firm's capital structure yields similar findings to those based on incremental financing decisions. We use multivariate regression for our sample to estimate the model with Debt Ratio as the dependent variable in Model 4. We find that private disclosers that move to public disclosure in the post FD period exhibit a decrease in their debt ratio when compared to the control group and New Nondisclosers (p<0.05). As we expect, we find the New Nondisclosers (p<0.00) exhibit higher debt ratios in the post Reg FD period than firms with more open disclosure policies.
Model 4a includes not only the Private and Public disclosing firms Wang (2007) identifies in the pre
Reg FD period but also includes the firms she identifies in the pre Reg FD period as nondisclosers. By construction, these nondisclosing firms are included in the control group with the public firms. Wang (2007) labels nondisclosing firms as those not clearly differentiated as either public or private firms in her tests, so misidentifying a privately disclosing firm as a control firm may bias against finding our expected results. However, if a firm is properly identified as a nondisclosing firm that does not make use of private communication channels prior to Reg FD, then Reg FD should have limited impact on such a firm. We find similar results in Model 4a that we find in Model 4, indicating an increased preference for debt in the New Nondiscloser firms; however, the coefficient on New Public is no longer significant as the financing preference of these firms in the post Reg FD period is no longer distinct from the comparison group of pre Reg FD public and nondisclosing firms.
Though the results above indicate that firms moving from private to public disclosure exhibit an increased propensity for equity financing after Reg FD, particularly when compared to firms moving from private to nondisclosure, our tests may not adequately capture the sequence of the disclose-equity issue decision. It is possible a firm coincidently increased disclosure around Reg FD to opportunistically decrease the cost of a future equity issue and then, subsequent to the issue, returned to a policy of less disclosure. 24 However, we believe there is little evidence of systematic strategic disclosure behavior in our sample for two reasons. First, the formerly private disclosers exhibited a significantly greater shift towards equity financing in the post Reg FD period than the public disclosers, 25 consistent with the 24 We appreciate an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.
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The Wang identified public disclosers issued equity more frequently than the private disclosers in the pre Reg FD period (23.2% versus 18.7%). Post Reg FD, there is a significantly greater shift in movement toward equity in the formerly private firms as 40.9% and 34.7% of the post Reg FD observations are equity issues for the formerly private and public firms respectively. response we would expect if Reg FD induced greater information flows of the private disclosers. More importantly, the movement towards equity financing of the two groups of formerly private disclosers is indistinguishable with 42.2% of the issues by new nondisclosure firms and 39.4% of the issues by new public firms are equity issues. We believe if a new public firm's disclosure choice represents a systematic and opportunistic decision strategically related to the future equity issue and not Reg FD, we would have found a much higher percentage of newly public disclosers issuing equity than we find.
Secondly, we examine changes in analyst forecast accuracy in the year following the equity issue of the new publicly disclosing firms. To accomplish this, we calculate mean analyst forecast error as the absolute value of the average annual forecast minus the actual value, scaled by the end of the month stock price (Mikhail et al. 2003) and winsorize the results at the 1% and 99% levels. We also calculate the median analyst forecast error as the median annual forecast minus the actual value, scaled by the end of the month stock price (Gu and Wu 2004) . We examine a t-test comparing analyst forecast error in the issue year to forecast error in the issue year t+1 for the Wang subsample of formerly private firms that moved to public disclosure in the post FD period. We find that the t-test for the change in mean and median analyst forecast error between the year of and the year following the new financing issue is not significant for this subgroup of firms as a whole or when examined separately for debt and equity issuers.
If the firm's choice to increase disclosure around the equity issue, in particular, was strategic and later followed by an opportunistic reduction in disclosure after the equity issue, we would have expected an increase in analyst forecast errors in the year subsequent to issuance.
Sensitivity Tests
We next carry out a range of tests to evaluate the robustness of our findings and to raise the confidence for any conclusions drawn. Since the passage of Reg FD occurred during a time of other important but potentially confounding events, careful reexamination of our results is required to ensure that our models capture the information effects related to Reg FD. To address the question of whether our results are driven by Reg FD's impact on the information environment or other simultaneous macroeconomic causes, we separately reestimate our models after excluding annual observations surrounding the enactment of Reg FD. We also carry out separate analysis by excluding financially constrained firms since these firms face limited financial flexibility. We also undertake an analysis using an alternative measurement of high proprietary costs and alternative thresholds to identify our equity and debt issuing firms. Finally, to examine whether our findings reflect trends in financing patterns, we reestimate our models using two alternative samples and alternative regulatory event dates.
While Reg FD became effective in October 2000, firms may have had some prior knowledge of the forthcoming restrictions on selective disclosure. Such knowledge may affect the identification of the impact of Reg FD on corporate financing activities. Thus, we exclude the 690 annual observations which include the months immediately surrounding Reg FD or fiscal years which include the months August through December 2000. 26 The proprietary cost measure for this model is the composite factor. In untabulated tests involving this reduced sample, we find the coefficient on the interaction Composite factor * RegFD remains positive and significant (p<0.01). We continue to find no significance on Pre followed * RegFD or the triple interaction among Reg FD, proprietary costs, and analyst following. This result provides further support that higher proprietary cost firms clearly increased their propensity to issue debt after Reg FD.
If a firm is financially constrained, it either reduces investment or, if it chose to fund itself through external resources, accepts any funding it can attain. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) examine firm financing choices under various macroeconomic conditions and find that a firm's financing choice may appear economically countercyclical if it is unconstrained and has the financial flexibility to time the debt and equity markets. One concern is whether the increased preference for debt financing that we find for high proprietary cost firms is not due to Reg FD but instead due to the simultaneous drop in the equity market which made equity access expensive and difficult for the firms we identify as high proprietary cost firms.
In light of the findings of Korajczyk and Levy (2003) , this may be particularly true of financially constrained firms facing limited financial flexibility and having no alternative but to accept debt financing.
Thus, we examine the impact of financial constraint upon our results reported previously.
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Our analysis yields the following findings. First, when we add an additional control variable to our model to represent financially constrained firms measured as per Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we find a positive and significant coefficient on this variable. 28 More importantly, the coefficients on our proprietary cost interactions with Reg FD remain materially unchanged from the results reported in Table 3 . Next, we rerun the model separately for the subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. For both the financially constrained (n=884) and the unconstrained (n=3,446) subsamples of firms, the coefficient on Composite factor * RegFD remains positive and significant. Neither the interaction between Composite factor and Pre followed nor the three-way interaction among Composite factor, Pre followed, and RegFD appears to significantly impact a firm's propensity for debt financing. Similar results are obtained from estimating the models where proprietary costs are captured by High Tech and R&D. Thus, it does not appear likely that the results reported in Table 3 are driven by financially constrained firms. 26 This exclusion eliminates observations with fiscal years beginning between September 1999 and December 2000. Alterations to this window to eliminate fiscal years which include September through November 2000 make no qualitative differences on the results reported above. 27 There are many measures in the literature used to identify financially constrained firms. Hennessey and Whited (2007) recommend measuring the financial constraint separately from the costs of financing. Thus, they recommend the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraint measure (KZ measure) to identify firms most in need of external funding. We identify financially constrained firms as those with a KZ measure in the top quintile of our sample firms. This data is not available for 23 of our sample observations. 28 The significance of the coefficient on the KZ measure suggests that financial constraint has a bearing on firm financing decisions that is distinct from the impact captured by factors such as Market to Book and Deficit. The finding indicates that over our time period, financially constrained firms exhibit a higher propensity for debt financing.
Next, we recognize that our proxy for firms most likely impacted by Reg FD, Pre followed, does not confirm whether a firm made private disclosures to analysts or whether Reg FD impacted its information environment. Our hypotheses rely on the conjecture that in the presence of high proprietary costs of disclosure, firms will seek to reduce the cost of equity financing through selective disclosure. After, Reg FD, these firms should view debt as a more attractive option for financing given new regulatory constraints on private disclosures. Thus, we construct a measure to identify within our sample, the pre Reg FD high proprietary cost firms (High PC Firm) relative to all Compustat firms meeting our data requirements.
Within our sample, we identify 906 observations representing 489 firms we identify as High PC Firms, specifically measured as a reported Composite factor within the highest annual tercile ranking of all
Compustat observations for at least one year between 1999 and 2000. This time period is consistent with the pre Reg FD period which we use to identify our Pre followed firms. In untabulated tests, we include
High PC Firm interacted with both RegFD and Pre followed and find that the coefficients on both interactions are positive and significant (p<0.01). Thus, although we cannot ascribe our increased debt financing propensity exclusively to the impact of the passage of Reg FD, even after controlling for analyst following, leverage, and deficit, we still find that there is an increased preference for debt financing after
Reg FD for firms facing relatively higher proprietary costs.
Additionally, we examine the impact of changing our identification of a debt or equity issuing observation from our 5% threshold. If we broaden debt (equity) observations to those issuing debt (stock) in excess of 3% of prior year assets (n=5,230), we find no qualitative differences in our results. If we limit our debt-equity firms to those issuing between 5% and 25% of prior year assets (n=3,166), or those firms exhibiting a need to raise external funds but not to the extent that requires a significant shift in corporate structure, we continue to find significance on the coefficient of the interaction between RegFD and our proprietary cost measures for High Tech, R&D, and Composite factor (p <0.01). However, if we restrict our sample to firms issuing debt or equity in excess of 25% of prior year assets, the coefficients on the proprietary cost interactions diminish in significance, if they remain significant at all. It appears that after a certain level of external funding is required, the preference for debt or equity financing is unrelated to the disclosure policies or proprietary costs a firm may face. We also examine the results of the full model if we change our definition of debt (equity) issuances using balance sheet measures 29 rather than cash flow measures; we find our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. Lastly, we adjust our definition of an equity issue to exclude the netting of share repurchases (essentially defining an equity issue as exceeding 29 As per Leary and Roberts (2010) , a balance sheet measure for the debt issuer is a firm where the net change in long-term debt plus the current portion of debt to prior year assets exceeds 5%. The equity issue is measured as the net increase in shares outstanding times the average of the high and low stock prices for the year. Leary and Roberts (2010) perform their main tests using the cash flow identification of equity issuers and the balance sheet identification of debt issuers. We prefer to utilize a consistent source to measure our equity and debt issuing firms.
5% of prior year assets regardless of shares repurchased). This adjustment increases our sample size to 4,478 with an increase (decrease) to equity (debt) issue observations of 188 (63); however, we find no material changes to our prior results as the coefficients on these interactions remain positive and significant for our composite measure (p<0.01), high technology measure (p<0.01), research and development measure (p<0.04), litigation risk measure (p<0.02), and our competitive indicator (p<0.04).
Finally, to address whether our findings simply reflect trends in financing patterns, we reanalyze our data using pseudo or fake event dates. One concern is that our results simply reflect trends in the treatment and control groups not attributable to Reg FD. To address this issue, a standard approach is to carry out socalled placebo tests. We examine whether our results, in terms of the differential response of high and low proprietary cost firms, hold even in the periods outside the regulatory change event. We first measure the incremental financing decision of two alternative samples of firms, each drawn either before or after Reg FD. We focus on the composite proprietary cost measure since it draws on the common elements in the individual proprietary cost measures. We define the first (second) alternative sample to include observations occurring between 1997-2000 (2003-2007 ) that meet our sample selection criteria. 30 We identified the pseudo-event as occurring in fiscal years ending after September 1998 (2005) and estimate the model. We intentionally define the later alternative sample period to include a period of time sufficiently outside of the period when the initial impact of Reg FD is most likely pronounced. We find no significance for any of the coefficients on the two-way and three-way interactions among RegFD, Composite factor, or Pre followed suggesting there is no shift in the financing propensity of the sample firms across either of these alternative sample periods. In both alternative samples, however, we continue to see differences in financing propensities of high and low-proprietary cost firms.
Conclusion
While theory posits that firm information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity, the empirical evidence to date is limited. One explanation for this lack of evidence is that endogeneity issues hamper the identification of this posited relation. We revisit this issue by taking advantage of a change in the disclosure regime. Specifically, we focus on Reg FD which restricted selective disclosure with the goal of inducing greater public disclosure of firm specific information.
While all public U.S. firms are subject to this regulation, it has been noted that its effects are not uniform across these firms. Specifically, prior research finds Reg FD has an adverse effect on the firm information environment of firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure. In contrast, Reg FD is 30 While all of our control and proprietary cost variables are measured as before, Pre followed is measured over the two year "pre" period of each alternative sample period, or between 1997-1998 and 2003-2004 for the early and late alternative sample periods, respectively. The early alternative sample includes 2,783 observations meeting our sample criteria and data availability requirements, while the later alternative sample includes 3,524 observations. found to improve the information environment of low proprietary cost firms in that it induced these firms to switch from private to public disclosure. In light of its impact on firm information environment, we exploit the Reg FD setting to examine how the regulation induced changes to firm information environment affected its financing decisions. To this end, our analysis distinguishes the differential impact of Reg FD on firms based on their proprietary costs of disclosure. We find high proprietary cost firms are more likely to issue debt in the post Reg FD regime. We find this result is robust across multiple measures of proprietary costs of disclosure. We also carry out further analysis by directly assessing changes in firm disclosure policy around Reg FD and relating these changes to firm financing decisions. Focusing on disclosure changes around Reg FD, we find an increase in firm public disclosure is positively associated with firm choice of information sensitive equity financing. Similarly, we also find some evidence that firms that did not adopt a higher public disclosure in response to Reg FD exhibit a greater reliance on debt financing.
Our study contributes to several streams of extant research. While the role of the information environment is prominent in the theoretical capital structure literature, empirical inquiry has been stymied by the lack of exogenous changes in the information environment. As such, Reg FD provides a natural experimental setting to evaluate information based capital structure theories. Consistent with theory, we find deterioration in the information environment has an incremental positive effect on the use of debt financing. We also contribute to the inquiry related to Reg FD. Our evidence is consistent with prior research which notes that the effect of Reg FD is not uniform across firms. The full sample includes 4,353 annual observations of firms with net cash receipts for debt or equity issuances (but not both) in excess of 5% of prior year assets with all required available data in Compustat. %Equity is the amount of cash received from stock issues (SSTK) less cash paid for stock repurchases (PRSTKC) divided by assets at the end of the prior year. %Debt Issue is the cash received from debt issues (DLTIS) less cash paid to retire debt (DLTR) divided by prior year assets. Size is firm size decile formed based on the Fama/French monthly NYSE market equity breakpoint at the end of the prior fiscal year, M to B equals the sum of preferred stock, market value of common equity and book value of debt divided by total assets, Net PP&E equals the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the beginning of year t, ∆AAA equals the average monthly change in the interest rate on the AAA corporate bonds over the year, EarnVar is the earnings variance calculated as the standard deviation of (EBIDT t -EBIDT t-1 ) divided by the mean of total assets, for the ten years prior to the issue (at least four years if data are missing), t cDUM is a trichotomous variable equal to 0 if the firm had an unused NOL carryforward and negative income in the prior year, 1 if the firm had either an unused NOL carryforward or negative income in the prior year, and 2 if the firm had no unused NOL carryforward and had positive income in the prior year, Lag Leverage equals long-term debt plus current portion of debt divided by the book value of the assets as of the end of the prior year, Deficit equals DIV t-1 + X t-1 + ∆W + R t-1 -C t-1 , all scaled by prior-year assets, where DIV=dividend payments, X=capital expenditures, ∆W equals net increase in working capital from year t-2 to t-1, R= current portion of long-term debt at the beginning of the period, and C=operating cash flows, after interest and taxes, Pre followed is an indicator variable measured as a 1 for any firm followed by two or more analysts prior to RegFD; Composite factor is the principal factor of the composite of Competitive, HighTech, R&D, and Litigation Risk, Competitive is an indicator of 1 if the firm operates in the top tercile of competitive industries, measured annually, using Hoberg and Phillips (2010) fitted SIC based industry concentration data, HighTech is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company operates within a high tech industry or zero otherwise (SIC codes coded as high tech include 2833 -2836 , 3612-3613, 3621-3629, 3651-3652, 3661-3669, 3671-3672, 3674, 3695, 4812-4822, and 4832-4899 per Bushee et al. (2004 ), R&D is the ratio of R&D expense to assets at the end of the prior year, and Litigation Risk is an indicator variable measured as per Kim and Skinner (2012) . Extreme observations are winsorized to the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. *** , ** and * indicate a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 difference respectively between the respective samples using a two sample mean test and Wilcoxon sum rank tests of the medians. Models 1-9 report coefficients of a logit analysis of the propensity to issue debt (DebtFund) as modeled in Equation 1 using the sample and independent variables described in Table 1 and Models 10-11 report the coefficients of the regression analysis of a firm's debt ratio (Debt Ratio). Pre followed firms report more than one annual analyst forecast during the two year window preceding RegFD. Proprietary cost * RegFD * Pre followed represents the interaction of the respective proprietary cost measure and RegFD of the firms covered by analysts prior to RegFD. All models include fiscal year indicator variables (results not tabulated) and the p values reported in parenthesis incorporate robust standard errors clustered by firm and fiscal year. 2833 -2836 , 3612-3613, 3621-3629, 3651-3652, 3661-3669, 3671-3672, 3674, 3695, 4812-4822, 4832-4899 per Bushee et. al. (2004 ). The Competitive indicator is 1 for firms operating in the top tercile of competitive industries as per Hoberg and Phillips (2010) . Litigation Risk is calculated as per Kim and Skinner (2012) and is a 1 for firms operating in the biotechnology (SIC 2833 to 2836 and 8731 to 8734), computer (SIC 3570 to 3577 and 7370 to 7374), electronics (SIC 3600 to 3674) or retail (SIC 5200 to 5961) industries and are above the median in one of the following: lagged total assets, monthly stock price volatility or lagged sales growth. Log (TA) is the log of the prior year total assets. Size measures the relative size of the firms' market value against the NYSE firms at the end of the prior year. *** , ** and * indicate a 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 difference respectively between the respective samples using a two sample mean test and a Wilcoxon sum rank tests of the medians. 
